‘The rise in offshore leverage across EM since 2009 has been broad, although focused in some markets in the banking system (e.g. Turkey where the loan to deposit ratio has reached 120%) and in others non-financial corporate. There is certainly no immediate prospect of a rerun of the 1982 Mexican or 1997 Asian crisis but the IB “buy the dip, this time is different” mantra looks as misplaced as their blind panic on the asset class in early 2016 deflation scare. When it comes to analyst group think, this time is never different…’ May 18th 2018 blog post
The views expressed back then and indeed since late 2017 have been vindicated by the relentless selloff across EM assets since, led by FX and the most crowded equity longs like Tencent – the consensus has now reversed decisively to being bullish USD and bearish EM. The Trump agenda was essentially to grab growth from the rest of the world and bring it home, thus delaying the potential end of US geopolitical dominance, and that is in GDP and equity market performance terms being achieved. We highlighted coming into this year the potentially toxic combination of a simultaneous USD and oil rally for vulnerable twin deficit emerging markets, notably Turkey, which has seen its oil import bill soar to 2008 levels.
EM FX correlations have risen sharply this year, but as with EM government and corporate bond yields still sit below the highs of early 2016 when the China deflation scare was at its peak. On a real effective terms of trade basis, several EM currencies now look cheap (including the TRY, BRL and ZAR) and corporate spreads are back at more ‘normal’ historical levels versus US high yield. There is certainly a risk of a further rise in correlations amid forced selling by investors if the IMF can’t effectively backstop Argentina and/or Turkey fails to adopt more orthodox monetary policies. However, we’re turning more constructive – we recently closed our DXY long and industrial metals tactical short positions from Q1. While the latest US employment and PMI data remains strong, the extreme divergence between US and Europe/EM relative economic momentum looks set to close in coming months.
One factor to watch closely is US shale oil, where there is growing evidence that we have seen an inflection point this summer for capex and production growth momentum, with Q4 outlook downgrades across the oil service sector. A reversal will have a high multiplier effect across the real economy and would likely shrink the WTI-Brent discount and squeeze US refining margins/utilisation rates lower while underpinning our $90/bl Brent crude price target into H1 19. While logistical congestion in the Permian is a factor, we’ve long argued that analysts are underestimating the risk that shale productivity is approaching a secular peak at a time when the sector is belatedly being forced by investors to generate positive free cash flow. In that scenario, assumed US production growth of about 1.5m bpd annually through 2020 will fall far short of expectations. This may well be the next overwhelming market consensus to crumble, with wide ranging macro implications…